If Poland does not come to an agreement on the NRP in the coming months - it will be too late for sensible spending of the money available to the country. By the end of June, the Polish government may present to the European Commission changes to the spending plan for the National Recovery Plan - completed with investments to increase resilience to the energy crisis. Consultations with the EC are just starting. This is the last bell for Poland to reach for loans and grants under the the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the REPowerEU plan. How to change the Polish NRP to make it a practical response to the energy crisis?

The upcoming winter will be difficult for many Polish households due to high costs of heat and electricity. In the latest report by Forum Energii, more than 30 concrete measures are listed. They can be implemented easily and at a low (or even none) cost before the heating season. This will reduce bills and improve the country's energy security.  

With one year delay the national Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) is entering Poland. So far, the discussion around the RRP has focused primarily on money. Meanwhile – and this is particularly evident in the area of energy transition – the RRP is an instrument that has mobilised the Polish government to work out the necessary reforms, involving an in-depth analysis of challenges ahead, assessment of specific solutions, and necessary legal changes, all within specific timeframe. Investment support – although crucial – plays a secondary role in accelerating the implementation of reforms.  

The European Union has decided to allocate 2% of the allowances from its emissions trading system (EU-ETS) for support to poorer countries in their energy transition. Since 2021 this money is transferred to Poland, among others. The local operator – the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management – has been distributing the funds without adequate public scrutiny and information. A year after taking charge of the Modernisation Fund, there is no transparent website to adequately inform society and potential applicants on what and how over EUR 11 bn (PLN 50 bn) is to be spent (and a further increase is on the table). This article deals with the consequences of the current flaws in this process and why their removal is so important for Poland.

The prices of coal, gas, and CO2 are reaching record levels while the price for electricity is galloping, causing panic among politicians, energy consumers, and institutions responsible for maintaining Poland’s energy security.

It’s PLN 560 billion [EUR 124 bln]. This is the amount Poland can allocate for the energy transition and phaseout of coal thanks to EU membership. This is a historic opportunity to shift the Polish economy—including the energy sector—to the low-carbon track and develop new industries. Although last year the Polish government declared the intention to pursue climate neutrality in line with EU policy, Poland’s decision-makers are anxious that the country will not be able to handle the challenge of decarbonisation. At the same time, the government’s relations with EU institutions are deteriorating, making talks about the EU funds difficult. So then, what resources are at stake?

In the following months, negotiations on the Fit for 55 package, which was proposed by the European Commission in July this, year will continue. One of the key elements of these negotiations is the reform of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). The Polish government is arguing that the number of allowances allocated to Poland will be lower than the emissions of installations covered by the ETS, creating a so-called imbalance of CO2 emission allowances. Where does the imbalance come from, and can it be reduced? And is this the most important element in negotiations of the new EU ETS? We explain below.

Poland’s energy sector is entering a period of major turbulence. The immediate question is the continued operation of the Turów power station since the EU Court of Justice recently ordered the suspension of lignite mining there. This is just the beginning of the problems. After 2025, when public support ends, the first 8 GW of coal capacity may leave the Polish system, and a little later, another 6 GW. The power plants will be shut down due to age and costs. Observing the government’s actions, one can get the impression that all hope lies in the proposed National Agency for Energy Security . Yet, this is a side discussion because no change in ownership structure will improve the situation of the failing coal power industry. Instead, difficult decisions must be made, and the possibilities of supporting the operation of coal-fired power plants with public money are already very limited.

On 14 July, the European Commission will publish the Fit for 55 package consisting of several legislative proposals. This will officially launch the discussion on measures to achieve the interim EU climate neutrality target, i.e. a 55% reduction of CO2 emissions compared to 1990. Before these rules finally come into force, they have to be accepted by EU member countries (i.e. the Council) and the European Parliament. The negotiations will take at least a year, most likely - two. The changes will not be law until 2024, but it is high time we considered how to implement them for the benefit of the climate and the economy.

Work on the European Green Deal is accelerating. The main tool to achieve the new targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the EU will be the Fit for 55 package. Among its key elements is support for reducing CO2 emissions from buildings and transport. For Poland, this debate will be uncomfortable because over the course of three decades, not only has pollution not decreased but it has increased considerably in transport. This results in terrible air quality in Poland. Catching up, which is necessary for both climate reasons and the modernisation of outdated infrastructure and improvement of air quality, will be a challenge. The introduction of emission charges is intended to help. In its latest study, Forum Energii proposes measures to internalise the external costs of emissions in a way that is smooth, gradual, and socially acceptable.